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Introduction
Over the next few years, you will be hearing 
much about the Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI, pronounced “Reggie”), the 
first	regional	mandatory	program	to	address	
climate change in the United States. 
This primer is designed to provide Maine 
citizens with a basic understanding of the 
program and the key decisions Maine must 
make in its implementation. RGGI’s success 
will require continued leadership, thoughtful 
discussion and creative solutions.
Background
In 2001, at a meeting of the New England 
Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers, 
the New England states and Atlantic prov-
inces of Canada agreed to work together on a 
plan to address global warming. For Maine, 
this	agreement	reflected	work	of	the	Maine	
Climate	Action	Plan,	which	identified	a	cap-
and-trade program for emissions reductions 
as one of the state’s highest priorities. The 
2003 Maine Greenhouse Gas Initiative built 
further on this commitment.
Over time, the concept of RGGI for the 
Northeastern United States (Canada had 
joined the Kyoto Protocol) took shape. The 
goal was to reduce carbon dioxide (CO2) 
emissions from power plants in participating 
states and create the impetus for a national 
plan while:
•	 allowing	flexibility,	to	encourage	innovation		
 in meeting the goals;
• maintaining energy affordability and   
 reliability;
• accommodating the diversity of individual   
 state’s policies and programs;
• emphasizing uniformity to facilitate interstate  
 allowance trading;
• being expandable so other states can join;
•  supporting other national, state or regional   
 emissions trading programs.
In late 2003, an interstate working group, mostly 
from the New England state environmental 
agencies, and a 25-member body of stake-
holders, including representatives of electricity 
generators, electric utilities, other businesses, 
residential consumers, and environmentalists, 
began to discuss the issues with experts 
and look at economic models, which led 
to the development of the RGGI program. 
In December 2005, the governors of seven 
states signed a 20-page Memorandum of 
Understanding adopting a plan for RGGI.
In March 2006, the participating states released 
a draft model rule outlining regulations for 
state governments to use in adopting RGGI. 
Public input was received from more than 100 
organizations. After revisions, the model rule 
was	finalized	and	released	in	August	2006.		
The basic provisions and next steps for RGGI are 
the focus of this primer.
1. RGGI Basics
What is RGGI?
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is 
an	agreement	to	implement	a	flexible,	mar-
ket-based program to reduce carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions—the major cause of global 
warming—from power plants in the North-
east and Mid-Atlantic states. 
The governors of Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Connecticut, New Jersey, New York 
and Delaware signed a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) adopting RGGI in De-
cember 2005. The District of Columbia, Mas-
sachusetts, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, the 
Eastern Canadian Provinces, and New Bruns-
wick were observers in the process. Maryland 
has since passed legislation to join the pro-
gram, and Massachusetts has agreed to sign 
the agreement early in 2007. Rhode Island has 
not agreed to implement the program, but 
may do so in the future.
In October 2006, California Governor Arnold 
Schwarzenegger, at a meeting with Governor 
Pataki of New York, (the convener of the 
original meeting in 2001), announced that 
California would join RGGI as well. 
RGGI’s bottom line: Total emissions in the 
RGGI states may not increase from 2009 to 
2014, and then must fall by 2.5% per year 
through 2018, so that by 2019 they must be at 
least 10% below the 2009 level. Modeling fore-
casts suggest that without RGGI, emissions 
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RGGI’s Key Provisions
 RGGI utilizes a cap-and-trade system: The  
 states have agreed to set limits (caps) on  
 emissions and then auction, sell, or give away 
 tradable allowances, one for each ton of CO2  
 allowed by the cap. 
 RGGI applies to all fossil fuel-fired electrical  
 generating plants with a rated capacity equal  
 to or greater than 25 megawatts. The indi- 
 vidual states will decide on the CO2 emission  
 limits for each regulated plant, which will  
 then buy and sell allowances to cover its  
 emission limit.
 Each state is required to sell or auction  a  
 minimum of 25% of its allowances and use
 the  proceeds for strategic energy or   
 consumer benefit purposes such as energy  
 efficiency, rate-payer rebates, or new clean  
 energy technologies. 
 Some portion of the emission reductions  
 can be gained from other sources. RGGI  
 specifies a number of categories of offset  
 allowances, such as planting trees to absorb  
 carbon.
 If allowance prices exceed certain defined  
 limits, RGGI has a “safety-valve” that allows  
 greater use of offset allowances and an  
 extension of the compliance period. 
from power plants in the region would grow 
by 7% from 2009 to 2019. Thus, compared to 
“business as usual,” RGGI is designed to cut 
emissions by around 17%.1 
The MOU sets the number of allowances bud-
geted to each state, the timetable for emission 
reductions, and criteria for acceptable offsets. 
RGGI is a regional plan, but each state must, 
by the end of 2008, adopt its own regulations 
or laws for RGGI to come into effect. The 
model rule, released by the RGGI interstate 
workgroup, forms the framework of individu-
al state regulatory and/or statutory proposals 
to adopt and implement the program.2 Each 
state will go through its own decision-making 
process, with the legal requirements varying 
among states. 
RGGI’s progress is being closely watched. 
Although	a	modest	first	step,	RGGI’s	cap-
and-trade program will provide important 
learning experiences for policymakers in other 
states, in Washington, D.C. (where Congress is 
considering the design of a national response), 
as well as internationally, where efforts such 
as the Kyoto Protocol (an international treaty 
on climate change) and the European Emis-
sion Trading System are already underway. 
It also provides a testing ground for develop-
ment of new technologies and markets.
Considerable experience has accumulated 
with the design and operation of cap-and-
trade systems for more traditional pollutants, 
including the highly successful U.S. programs 
to reduce sulfur dioxide—the main cause of 
acid rain—and nitrous oxides which are a major 
factor in causing ground-level ozone or smog. 
Using this approach to control greenhouse gases 
is breaking new ground in the United States.3 
Why worry about global warming?
A strong consensus now exists within the 
scientific	community	that	the	earth	is	warming	
as a result of emissions of CO2 and other green-
house gases that are produced by human 
activities such as the combustion of fossil fuels 
(coal, oil, natural gas) and changes in land use. 
Global warming gases are associated with, 
but different from, local air pollutants that 
cause smog or particulate emissions. They 
have diverse sources and reductions anywhere 
have a positive global impact.
According to the Pew Center on Global Climate 
Change, the continuation of historical trends of 
greenhouse gas emissions will result in additional 
warming, with current projections of a global 
increase of 2.5ºF–10.4ºF by 2100 and warming in 
some parts the U.S. expected to be even higher.4
Global warming of this magnitude is likely to be 
accompanied by other changes (many of which 
will have a direct impact on Maine), including:
• increased frequency and severity of storms,  
	 floods,	and	droughts;
• melting of glaciers, ice sheets, and the polar  
 sea-ice, raising sea levels to cover shoreline   
 and low-lying land;
• increases in infectious diseases, such as the   
 West Nile Virus;
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What is RGGI’s expected effect on 
electricity costs and the economy?
Available evidence from modeling done by 
the RGGI states and by independent organi-
zations indicates that RGGI will have little 
impact on the cost of doing business or on the 
overall economy in the Northeast. This is be-
cause the goals of RGGI are fairly modest and 
are stretched out over more than a decade, 
regulated power plants are allowed to use off-
sets to meet part of their emission reductions, 
and electricity use is only a small portion of 
the economy.7
The maximum increases in retail electric 
rates projected by the RGGI models are about 
0.5% to 0.66% per year—a rate-of-change that 
would be barely noticeable to consumers. By 
2021, residential and commercial rates could 
rise between 1% and 5%, with industrial rates 
rising between 1% and 10%. The impact of 
RGGI is small compared to other factors that 
might affect rates, such as changes in fuel 
prices (note the 25% or greater rate increases 
during the winter of 2005–2006 as gas and oil 
prices skyrocketed).
Electric rate increases could be reduced by 
instituting	efficiencies	that	shrink	demand.	
Rising demand for electricity drives costly 
investments in power plants and transmission 
lines.	Improved	energy	efficiency	(such	as	
installing energy saving light bulbs and home 
insulation) can reduce the need for these 
investments, lower electricity rates by reduc-
ing peak demand, and minimize pressure on 
strained natural gas supplies.
• changes in distribution and abundance  
 of native tree, plant, and animal species;
• disruption of agriculture, forestry, and  
 recreational industries.5
RGGI will not only reduce the region’s emis-
sions, it is designed to be a component of a 
national and international response to the 
extremely rapid increases in greenhouse gases 
of recent decades. Climate scientists broadly 
agree that the heat-trapping pollution from 
all sectors of the economy must eventually be 
cut substantially, if we are to limit the harmful 
effects of continued warming of our planet.
Why focus on power plants?
Releases of CO2	account	for	four-fifths	of	
global warming pollution. The power sec-
tor is the largest single source of industrial 
emissions, accounting for 38% of U.S. global 
warming gases,6 although in the Northeast 
they are now second to transportation. 
Power plants are a relatively straightforward 
sector to address through state and regional 
policies for two reasons. First, most state gov-
ernments have regulatory authority over elec-
tricity generation, while the federal govern-
ment has most of the authority over pollution 
from cars and other transportation. Second, 
most electricity is generated at a fairly small 
number of plants that are easy to identify. In 
contrast, the other sources of global warm-
ing emissions, such as oil and natural gas to 
heat buildings and run industrial processes, 
are far smaller, more numerous, and harder to 
directly regulate. 
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2. RGGI’s “Nuts and Bolts”  
What is cap-and-trade and how does it 
work?
Traditional environmental regulations require 
each regulated facility, such as an industrial 
company or a power plant, to use “best avail-
able technology” to reduce air or water pollu-
tion, or to cut emissions by a certain amount 
regardless of economics at the plant level. 
With RGGI, CO2 emissions from the electric-
ity generating sector are capped within each 
state at approximately 2006 levels. The state 
then sets compliance requirements for each 
regulated power plant. The regulated plant 
is given or buys emission allowances, which 
it can save (i.e. bank), trade or sell to meet 
compliance levels. Some plants will be able to 
cut emissions more inexpensively than others. 
Those that can do so will be able to sell their 
surplus allowances to those whose costs of 
compliance are higher, or whose initial al-
location	proves	insufficient.	Trading	can	take	
place within a state or across state lines within 
the RGGI region. 
Power companies can also cut their CO2 
emissions by making their operations more 
efficient,	by	switching	from	higher	emitting	
to lower emitting fuels (from coal to natural 
gas or to renewable sources such as biomass 
or	wind),	by	shutting	down	older,	less	effi-
cient plants in favor of more modern, lower 
emitting plants, encouraging and enabling 
consumers to use less electricity through de-
mand management programs, or potentially 
by using carbon sequestration technologies 
currently in development to capture CO2 and 
store it permanently underground before it 
enters the atmosphere. 
RGGI’s	cap-and-trade	program	is	flexible	in	
that it includes several alternatives to allow 
regulated power plants options for meeting 
their emissions cap and some safety features 
to limit the price of allowances. 
What are “offsets”?
In addition to the different possibilities for 
meeting the cap listed above, RGGI also al-
lows offsets—alternative means of reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions, other than cutting 
CO2 emissions at power plants themselves. 
CO2 is emitted from other sectors of the econ-
omy, mainly through the burning of fossil fu-
els. Some pollutants, including methane gas, 
produce a more powerful global warming 
effect per pound than CO2 (though they tend 
to be emitted in far smaller quantities). It is 
from these other sectors of the economy and 
Offsets are a new market 
that can potentially 
provide economic 
opportunities for Maine.
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these other greenhouse gases that offsets are 
typically drawn. Permitting offset allowances 
from other sectors to achieve compliance 
expands the reduction possibilities and 
provides	more	flexibility	and	the	likelihood	
of lower costs. The Memorandum of Under-
standing	(MOU)	specifies	that	the	types	of	
offsets listed on this page will be allowed.
Electricity generators would be allowed to 
cover up to 3.3% of their total emissions by 
buying offset allowances. This is estimated to 
be approximately 50% of the reductions 
required by RGGI from their “business as 
usual” emissions. 
To be eligible for inclusion in RGGI, offsets 
would	have	to	meet	a	strict	five-point	set	of	
standards: that the offsets are “real, surplus, 
verifiable,	permanent,	and	enforceable,”	as	
stated in the MOU. Offset projects can take 
place anywhere in the U.S. as long as that 
state has entered into a memo of understand-
ing with the RGGI states that ensures the 
credibility of the offsets. 
Because the pool of potential emission 
reductions is not limited to power plant 
improvements or to RGGI states, offsets can 
create a large pool of additional emission 
reductions that can help maintain a well-
functioning market. Offsets are a new market 
that can potentially provide economic 
opportunities for Maine businesses.
Types of Allowable Offsets
 Capturing methane gas that would  
 normally be emitted from landfills 
 and agriculture, and then burning  
 the methane as an energy source 
 (the burning releases CO2, but this 
 is much less significant  than if the  
 methane were released directly to 
 the atmosphere).
 Capturing and recycling sulfur hexa- 
 fluoride (SF6 ) gas, a potent green 
 house gas used in electrical trans- 
 formers.
 Planting trees (which absorb CO2 
 and  release oxygen).
 Improving the efficiency of non- 
 power generation uses of natural 
 gas  and heating oil, such as heating  
 buildings and hot water.
 Reducing methane emissions from  
 natural gas transmission and 
 distribution.
 Additional offset allowances, such as  
 forest management, may be added  
 later.
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For	example,	a	landfill	that	does	not	currently	
capture methane gas could begin to do so 
and	flare	it,	consuming	the	methane	gas	and	
reducing its impact. The methane reduction, 
net the additional CO2	from	flaring,	would	
qualify as an offset allowance that could be 
sold to anyone looking for an offset allow-
ance either to meet their compliance needs or 
for investment. The same would be true for a 
cattle feedlot that now might gather manure 
and used an anaerobic digester to prevent 
methane emissions from going into the air.
What is the “safety valve”?
RGGI’s MOU sets two “safety valves” to limit 
prices for emission allowances.
If the average market price for allowances 
exceeds $7/ton of CO2, regulated power 
plants could use offset allowances to cover up 
to 5% of their emissions instead of 3.3%. If the 
average market price for allowances exceeds 
$10/ton of CO2, offset allowances can be used 
to cover 10% of emissions. Regulated power 
plants would be allowed to extend by up to 
one year their compliance with the emission 
levels set by the MOU. The safety valve prices 
are adjusted upward by the Consumer Price 
Index plus 2% per year, beginning in 2006. 
What is “leakage”? 
Leakage addresses the issue of electrical gen-
erating plants outside RGGI, with no costs of 
compliance, selling power into RGGI states.
Since CO2 emissions are a global problem, 
shifting the location of emissions would un-
dermine	the	program	and	provide	no	benefit	
to the climate.
RGGI modeling forecasts that, in the absence 
of controls on leakage, imported power could 
expand greatly, negating 40% or more of the 
emission reductions from RGGI. Such a result 
would effectively prevent RGGI from reach-
ing its goal of cutting emissions 10% by 2019. 
Addressing leakage issues is an implementa-
tion priority. 
The straightforward way to prevent leakage 
would be for all states to function under a 
common system, and that is what advocates 
of a national policy hope to achieve. Other 
solutions, such as requiring imported power 
to meet emissions requirements, introduce 
certain legal complications. Recognizing the 
complexity, the MOU says that the states will 
“pursue technically sound measures to pre-
vent leakage from undermining the integrity 
of the program.” An interstate working group 
is actively considering options for addressing 
leakage and will report in December 2007.
One promising option is to reduce the de-
mand for electricity generation. By reducing 
demand, less electricity will be imported into 
New England and, hence, there will be less 
opportunity to export carbon generation. 
Leakage is also reduced by neighboring states 
adoption of carbon reduction measures and 
by Canada’s compliance with Kyoto targets. 
Nonetheless, leakage remains a serious issue.
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Decisions Maine Must Make
ALLOWANCES
  
  Who gets allowances to emit CO2 and  
  how much will they cost? 
  
  Will emission allowances be sold, auc- 
  tioned, or given away?
 
  If allowances are given away, what are   
  the criteria?
 
  How will allowances be put aside for  
  new entrants?
PUBLIC  BENEFIT FROM REVENUES
  
  What percentage of revenues should  
  be dedicated to public sector benefits  
  and how should they be used?
THE PROCESS 
 
  What is the role of Maine’s legislature  
  and Department of Environmental
  Protection?
  
  How can interested parties get
  involved?
3. Decisions for Maine
RGGI’s Memorandum of Understanding 
(MOU) is a set of policies that have already 
been accepted by the signing states. The state 
regulations implementing RGGI can be modi-
fied,	in	some	limited	respects,	from	the	model	
rule, as long as they remain consistent with 
the MOU. Maine and other states will develop 
their own regulations to meet their unique 
needs. 
Each state has a budget for the tons of CO2 
that its power plants can emit. By January 
2009, the Maine Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP) must determine each 
regulated power plants emission limit. 
RGGI	affects	only	fossil	fuel-fired	electricity	
generating units having a rated capacity equal 
to or greater than 25 megawatts. In Maine, 
this applies to six electrical generating plants. 
Smaller generating plants, as well as non car-
bon dioxide-emitting generation plants that 
rely on nuclear, hydro, wind, or renewable 
sources are not regulated.
Five out of the six regulated power plants 
in	Maine	are	new	natural	gas	fired	turbines.		
Two	are	natural	gas	fired	combined	cycle	
co-generation plants, and are the lowest emit-
ting plants technologically available. By co-
locating with an industrial plant (two paper 
companies in Maine’s case), steam produced 
as a by-product of the industrial process 
becomes an additional source of power. Often 
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called combined heat and power, they are 
among	the	most	efficient	generators	in	the	
country, so options for reducing CO2 emis-
sions are limited.
Decisions about how Maine implements RGGI 
will be made throughout 2007. The basis for 
allocating CO2 limits, whether allowances 
are given, sold or auctioned, and how much 
revenue	should	be	set	aside	for	public	benefit	
and for what use, are some of the key issues 
that will be informed by the public process set 
up by the Maine DEP.
ALLOWANCES
Allowances are the trading mechanism as-
signed to emissions for the purposes of cap-
and-trade. One emission allowance equals one 
ton of CO2 emissions. Maine’s total emissions 
allocation is 5.95 million tons,8 or 5.95 million 
allowances. Each regulated power plant will 
need	a	sufficient	number	of	allowances	to	
cover its CO2 emission limit. The penalty for 
failing	to	have	sufficient	emission	allowances	
at the end of the compliance period will be a 
deduction of three times the excess emissions 
from the regulated power plants future alloca-
tion of allowances. 
Who gets allowances to emit CO2 and 
how much will they cost?
According to the MOU accepted by Maine 
and the other RGGI states, each state must 
sell at least 25% of its allowances, with the 
money	used	for	consumer	benefit	or	strategic	
energy purpose. Buyers will predominantly 
be the regulated power plants, but anyone can 
purchase allowances—individuals, environ-
mental groups or investors within or outside 
of the RGGI area. Each state may allocate the 
remaining 75% of the allowances as it wishes, 
including giving them to regulated power 
plants, retaining some for new plants, or sell-
ing them and using the revenues to enhance 
energy	efficiency	or	to	provide	public	benefits.	
Regulated power plants can buy allowances 
and sell excess allowances in an open market 
spanning the RGGI states. The price for an 
allowance will be set by supply and demand, 
influenced	by	what	it	costs	to	reduce	emis-
sions or purchase offsets. Modeling done as 
part of the RGGI process, using a wide variety 
of assumptions, estimated that CO2 allow-
ances are expected to sell for between $1/ton 
to above $10/ton, depending on modeling 
assumptions and energy prices.9 Allowance 
prices	will	be	influenced	by	energy	costs,	tech-
nological innovation, electricity demand, and 
the	availability	of	efficiency	improvements	in	
existing generators, among other factors.
Will emission allowances be sold, 
auctioned or given away? 
Even at the low expected cost of allowances, 
the RGGI program will create a substantial 
new market. Maine’s allocation of 5.95 mil-
lion tons and an estimated allowance price of 
$5/ton would yield a total value of Maine’s 
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allocation at about $30 million per year. Given 
the value of this market, it is not surprising 
that	one	of	the	most	difficult	issues	is	deter-
mining a fair and equitable way to determine 
allowance allocations.    
The arguement for giving allowances to regu-
lated plants is that it eases the transition to a 
new regulatory regime with new pollution 
control liabilities. How plants choose to utilize 
these allowances, such as using all of them to 
cover their existing emissions, or instead to re-
duce	emissions	through	efficiency	techniques	
and then sell the excess allowances, is left up 
to	competitive	pressures	and	individual	firm	
decision making. This is the method used in 
the European Emission Trading System (ETS). 
Giving allowances to regulated power plants 
in Maine and other RGGI states may also help 
keep the RGGI state power plants competitive 
with non-RGGI power plants that sell and buy 
electricity to and from the RGGI region.  
At	the	same	time,	there	are	justifications	for	
auctioning more than 25% of the state’s allow-
ances. The revenues from allowance sales can 
be	used	to	fund	energy	efficiency	programs,	
provide for consumer rebates, support de-
velopment of renewable energy projects, or 
otherwise lower the costs to consumers from 
rate hikes associated with increased costs of 
electricity generation due to the new regula-
tions.  
Some evidence from the European ETS and 
from studies of the proposed RGGI system 
and a national carbon trading system suggests 
that when allowances are given away, the 
result	is	higher	generator	profits	and	possibly	
less incentive to reduce emissions.10 11 12
These	same	studies	find	that	charging	genera-
tors for their allowances will not cause the 
prices to rise compared to giving the allow-
ances away. They note that in deregulated 
electricity markets, such as those in the North-
east, electricity prices are based not on the 
average cost of producing power, but on the 
incremental cost of additional power needed 
to meet demand at any given time. While the 
average cost may rise if generators must buy 
their allowances, the last dispatched price is 
based on the cost of available power to meet 
additional demand, not average price. This 
is true whether the electricity is generated 
within the Northeast or imported from states 
or countries neighboring the RGGI region.  
If allowances are given to regulated 
power plants, what are the criteria?
In the past, regulators have used either the 
level of average historical emission rates as 
the basis for allocations (“grandfathering”) 
or allocation emission rates implied by the 
best available technology (“benchmarking”). 
Another method, output-based allocations, 
awards allowances in proportion to current 
electricity generation, updated each year to 
reflect	changes	in	generation	at	that	facility.	
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Grandfathering on the basis of historic emis-
sions rates tends to reward the most polluting 
plants	and	discriminates	against	firms	that	
have already taken action to reduce emissions. 
Benchmarking tends to favor the plants that 
have effectively reduced their ratio of carbon 
emissions per unit output. Output-based al-
locations	tend	to	level	the	playing	field	and	
allow for new entrants to gain market share. 
As noted previously, some of Maine’s operat-
ing	facilities	are	older,	less	efficient	plants,	but	
others	are	quite	efficient	already.	
What are the rules for allocation of per-
mits to potential new entrants? 
Another key implementation question will be 
how to structure allocations to accommodate 
new market entrants. If all fossil fuel-powered 
electric generation has to function under a 
cap, some provision must be established to 
create room under the cap for new generators. 
Under the U.S. Acid Rain Trading Program, 
for example, the Environmental Protection 
Agency holds aside a small percentage of 
each year’s total allowance pool and puts it 
in a “bank” that can then be tapped to accom-
modate new entries to the electric generating 
market. Because the allowances were culled 
from the total pool, the new emissions repre-
sented by the new generation do not exceed 
the yearly emissions budget.
PUBLIC BENEFITS FROM REVENUES
What percentage of revenues should be 
dedicated to public sector benefits and 
how will they be used? 
According to the MOU, at least 25% of a 
state’s allowances are to be dedicated to stra-
tegic	energy	or	consumer	benefit	purposes,	
such	as	rate-payer	rebates,	energy	efficiency,	
and new clean energy technologies. Maine 
will have to decide if it wants to keep or raise 
that percentage. It is also up to each individ-
ual state to decide on the process and proce-
dure	for	determining	the	specific	use	of	those	
revenues	for	the	public	benefit.		
Some	to-be-defined	portion	of	the	revenues	
generated from the sale of allowances could 
be allocated to directly offset impacts from the 
RGGI program on electricity bills, a strategy 
that could be effective in helping low income 
households. At the same time, electricity rates 
send signals to consumers (lower rates tend 
to increase usage), so care must be taken not 
to undermine the conservation incentives 
that are a crucial aspect of the program. One 
way to do this is to target the rebates only at 
the most vulnerable households. Another is 
to	provide	a	fixed	rebate	per	household	(not	
a rebate that rises with consumption level) 
so that the consumer can pocket any savings 
achieved from reduced consumption.
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Allowance revenues can also be dedicated 
towards	energy	efficiency	programs.	By	in-
creasing	spending	on	energy	efficiency	with	
proceeds from allowance sales or other funds, 
RGGI could assist electricity customers in cut-
ting their monthly bills by lowering electricity 
consumption without lowering services (in-
stalling temperature controls, energy saving 
lightbulbs, etc.). Modeling performed as part 
of RGGI’s development examined the impacts 
from	doubling	current	spending	on	efficiency	
programs in the nine original RGGI states. 
The analysis found that if such doubling was 
continued for 15 years, the average household 
would see its electric bill fall by about $100 
a year, or roughly 12%. Business customers 
would gain a similar savings.13
The	amount	of	funding	available	for	efficiency	
and rebates would depend on what percent-
age of the allowances regulated power plants 
must buy and the allowance market price. It is 
unlikely that the necessary funding to double 
efficiency	spending	could	be	obtained	if	regu-
lated power plants pay for only 25% of their 
emissions allowances. 
Most of the Northeast states already have 
state-mandated programs that help pay for 
energy	efficiency	measures;	although	in	some	
states the funding is quite limited. Historical 
evidence shows that over time these programs 
save consumers more on their electric bills 
than they cost. For New England, the evi-
dence	suggests	that	efficiency	programs	could	
save electricity for about one third the cost 
of generating the same amount of power. In 
coming years, more than enough cost-effective 
efficiency	potential	is	available	to	completely	
cancel out projected increases in electricity 
demand.14
Funding clean energy technologies would 
stimulate or reward investment in the 
research and development of new innovative 
carbon emissions abatement technologies and 
promote renewable or non-carbon emitting 
energy advances such as wind, solar and 
geothermal power generation.
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...evidence suggests 
that efficiency programs 
could save electricity 
for about 1/3 the cost 
of generating the same 
amount of power.
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THE PROCESS
What is the role of Maine’s legislature 
and Department of Environmental 
Protection (DEP)?
In some of the RGGI states, the state environ-
mental agencies already have authority under 
existing laws to require that power plants 
reduce their carbon dioxide emissions. 
However, because of RGGI’s potential impact, 
state agencies may seek legislative approval 
even though they do not believe that it is a 
legal necessity. 
In Maine, the legislature must pass new 
legislation directing Maine DEP to develop 
rules and regulations for implementing RGGI, 
including establishing allocation limits, sell-
ing or auctioning allowances, collecting and 
dispersing funds. Certain regulations must be 
reviewed after adoption by the Maine DEP. 
Because these are major and substantive 
actions, the rules will go back to the legisla-
ture before they become law.
How can interested parties get involved?
Beginning in October 2006 and continuing 
through December 2006, Maine DEP held a 
series of regional roundtable discussions to 
provide information and solicit comments on 
how to tailor the model rule to meet Maine’s 
needs and circumstances. 
Maine DEP intends to submit a bill in the 
123rd legislative session in early February, 
2007 to authorize the implementation of 
the rule. The legislation will be referred to 
the appropriate committee which will hold 
one or more public hearings, followed by 
one	or	more	working	sessions	to	finalize	the	
proposed legislation. After committee, the 
proposed legislation would come before the 
full house and senate, then the governor for 
approval. This process should be completed 
before the session ends in June. The bill would 
take effect 90 days later and includes provi-
sions for Maine DEP to undertake rule-mak-
ing for implementation.  
Once the bill is referred to committee,you can 
find	information	on	the	legislative	schedule	
and the date and location of public hearings, 
at the Maine State Government website:
http://www.maine.gov/portal/government/
legislature.html. Click on “Public Hearings.” 
You can also sign up for advance notice of
public hearings on this page as well.
4. Looking beyond Maine
What else is happening at the state and 
federal level? 
The federal government has a number of 
policy	measures,	financial	incentives,	and	vol-
untary programs aimed at slowing the growth 
of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and 
reducing GHG intensity of the U.S. economy. 
Federal programs, including Climate VISION 
and Energy STAR, work with industry to 
reduce emissions voluntarily. These programs 
and other research and clean energy technol-
ogy development projects are coordinated 
by the Federal Climate Change Technology 
Program. 
In addition, the Federal Climate Change 
Initiative has as its goal to cut the greenhouse 
gas intensity of the economy by 18% over a 
period of 10 years, from 2002 to 2012. Green-
house gas intensity measures the ratio of CO2 
equivalent emissions to economic output. The 
goal is to reduce the amount of CO2 equiva-
lent emissions per dollar of Gross Domestic 
Product. Further reductions in CO2 emissions 
are likely from the new “Twenty In Ten” pro-
gram to reduce the nation’s use of gasoline by 
20% in 10 years. Reducing the CO2 intensity of 
the U.S. economy and furthering research on 
low carbon technologies are important steps 
to reducing national GHG emissions, but 
these federal programs do not directly cap or 
reduce the level of U.S. GHG emissions. 
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Frustration at the lack of a mandatory federal 
cap on U.S. GHG emissions has led munici-
palities and states to undertake a broad range 
of activities to cap and reduce GHG on their 
own. In June 2005, the U.S. Conference of 
Mayors unanimously endorsed the U.S. May-
ors Climate Protection Agreement that urges 
U.S. cities to follow the principles of the Kyoto 
Protocol, despite the fact that the U.S. has not 
ratified	the	Protocol.	The	Agreement	has	now	
been signed by 307 mayors representing over 
50 million Americans. In 1997, Oregon became 
the	first	state	to	regulate	the	GHG	emissions	
by requiring that new power plants counter 
their global warming impact by offsetting 
approximately 17% of their CO2 emissions by 
attaining	high	efficiency	standards	in	genera-
tion or by purchasing offsets. 
In 2005, California adopted emission reduc-
tion targets that reduce California GHG 
emissions to 2000 levels by 2010, 1990 levels 
by 2020 and 80% below 1990 levels by 2050. 
This is assisted by a low carbon fuel standard, 
announced in January, which requires fuel 
providers to ensure that the mix of fuels they 
sell for passenger vehicles produces 10 
percent fewer greenhouse gas emissions by 
2020. In addition, California and Oregon are 
also developing a “load-side cap-and-trade” 
approach, which focuses on those who 
purchase electricity, rather then those who 
generate it. Like RGGI, this load-side cap-
and-trade program focuses on the power 
system, but unlike RGGI, it counts and caps 
the carbon associated with power purchases, 
regardless of where the power originates. The 
details on the California-Oregon cap-and-
trade	program	have	yet	to	be	finalized.	
Other states, including Arizona and New 
Mexico, are also in the process of adopting 
programs to reduce GHG emissions. 
State and municipal actions are a collective 
first	step	toward	a	mandatory	program	for	
the entire United States. Lessons taken from 
these efforts should make valuable contri-
butions to future efforts at the national and 
international levels. 
RESOURCES
Climate Change Institute, University of 
Maine: www.climatechange.umaine.edu
Maine Department of Environmental 
Protection: www.maine.gov/dep
Maine Greenhouse Gas Initiative: 
http://maineghg.raadassociates.org
Lee International: www.go-worldlee.com
Pew Center on Global Climate Change:
www.pewclimate.org
Point Carbon: www.pointcarbon.com
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative: 
www.rggi.org  
United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change: http://unfccc.int/2860.php
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency:
www.epa.gov
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Glossary
Allowances, sometimes called permits or 
credits, are a trading unit used in cap-and-
trade (see below) systems. One allowance au-
thorizes the emission of up to one short-ton of 
CO2 (2000 pounds). In RGGI, as in other cap-
and-trade systems, there are a predetermined 
number of allowances that are budgeted for 
each region and assigned to each regulated 
source. Allowances are then auctioned, sold 
or given away to regulated sources to cover 
their emissions. Regulated power plants can 
sell excess, or buy additional allowances, but 
must have enough allowances to cover their 
emissions.
Cap-and-Trade is a market-based system 
that caps (places limits on) emissions and 
then allows allowance holders to trade (buy 
and sell) allowances. Some cap-and-trade 
systems also allow allowances to be banked 
for later use. Cap-and-trade systems create a 
financial	incentive	for	emission	reductions	by	
assigning	a	cost	to	emissions	and	a	benefit	to	
emission reductions.  Those that are able to 
reduce emissions at a low cost can sell their 
extra allowances to companies facing high 
costs.  Cap-and-trade systems give companies 
flexibility	in	the	manner	in	which	they	may	
achieve their emission targets and they set a 
clear limit on emissions. 
 
Consumer Benefit,	as	defined	in	the	RGGI	
MOU, refers to a proportion of allowances 
sales that will be directed to “promote en-
ergy	efficiency,	to	directly	mitigate	electricity	
ratepayer impacts, to promote renewable or 
non-carbon-emitting energy technologies, to 
stimulate or reward investment in the devel-
opment of innovative carbon emissions abate-
ment	technologies	with	significant	carbon	
reduction potential, and/or fund administra-
tion of [RGGI].” In RGGI, each state develops 
its own guidelines on how to administer these 
funds consistent with the MOU. 
Carbon Dioxide (CO2) is a colorless, odor-
less,	and	non-flammable	gas.	Solid	carbon	
dioxide is known as dry ice. Carbon dioxide 
is the fourth most-abundant gas in the earth’s 
atmosphere. Animals and people exhale car-
bon dioxide and plants use photosynthesis to 
convert it to sugars and other forms of energy. 
The concentration of CO2 in earth’s atmo-
sphere has increased during the past century 
as a result of increased combustion of fossil 
fuels and changes in land use.
European Emissions Trading System (ETS) 
is a cap-and-trade system to limit CO2 emis-
sions from large industrial sources within 
the European Union. Since January 2005, the 
power sector (all fossil fuel generators over 
20	MW),	oil	refining,	cement	production,	iron	
and steel manufacture, glass and ceramics, 
and paper and pulp production must meet 
targets in line with the implementation of 
each country’s Kyoto commitment.
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Greenhouse Gases (GHG) naturally blanket 
the earth and keep it about 33 degrees Celsius 
warmer than it would be without these gases 
in the atmosphere.  This is called the “Green-
house Effect.”  Over the past century, the 
earth has increased in temperature by about .5 
degrees Celsius. The main greenhouse gases 
are carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, 
and	fluorocarbons.	
Kyoto Protocol is an international treaty 
on climate change that assigns mandatory 
targets for the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions to the 39 industrialized nations that 
have	ratified	that	treaty.	The	Kyoto	Protocol	
now covers more than 160 countries globally 
and over 55% of global greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions. 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) 
is the formal agreement to a set of policies, 
signed in 2005, by the governors of Maine, 
New Hampshire, Vermont, Connecticut, New 
Jersey, New York and Delaware to move 
forward with the implementation of RGGI 
in their states. The terms of the agreement 
set CO2 limits for each state, a time-table for 
emissions reductions, criteria for acceptable 
offsets, and other implementation guidelines.   
Model Rule outlines	in	specific	detail	the	
rules necessary to implement the principles 
and emission targets agreed to in the MOU 
and provides a common framework for indi-
vidual states’ regulations. The model rule was 
developed by the interstate working group, 
with input from a 25-person stakeholder 
group and public comments, before being 
finalized	and	released	in	August	of	2006.
Offsets are allowances (or credits) that are 
certified	emissions	reductions	or	carbon	se-
questration that take place outside the electric 
generating	sector	in	specified	project	areas.	In	
RGGI,	offsets	may	be	issued	to	verified	reduc-
tion projects to cover up to 3.3% of a plant’s 
total emissions. 
Regulated power plant is any fossil fuel-
fired	electricity	generating	unit	having	a	rated	
capacity equal to or greater than 25 megawatts 
within the RGGI states. 
Safety Valve is a term used in cap-and-trade 
systems to limit the cost of allowances and 
protect regulated power plants from being 
overburdened. If the cost of an allowance 
rises above a certain average threshold for a 
sustained period, the safety value is triggered 
and allows generators an extra year to meet 
emissions levels, and an increase in the per-
centage of their emissions that can be covered 
by offsets. 
Strategic Energy Benefit (see Consumer 
benefit	above)
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